We extend Dubois and Prade's possibilistic decision theory to multi-stage decision making. E ects of actions are described by possibility distributions; objectives are speci ed either by a partition of the nal states between goal and non-goal states, or more generally by a qualitative utility function. Optimal policies are computed by an algorithm in the style of dynamic programming.
INTRODUCTION
For a few years, there has been a growing interest in the Arti cial Intelligence community towards the foundations and computational methods of decision making under uncertainty. This is especially relevant for applications to planning, where a suitable sequence of decisions is to be found, starting from a description of the initial world, of the available decisions and their e ects, and of the goals to reach. Several authors have thus proposed to integrate some parts of decision theory into the planning paradigm; but up to now, they have focussed on \classical" models for decision making, based on Markov decision processes (where actions are stochastic and the satisfaction of agents expressed by a numerical, additive utility function), and its computational counterpart, dynamic programming. However, transition probabilities for representing the e ects of actions are not always available, especially in AI applications where uncertainty is often ordinal, qualitative. The same remark applies to utilities: it is often more adequate to represent preference over states simply with an ordering relation rather than with additive utilities. Recently, several authors have advocated this qualitative view of decision making and have proposed qualitative versions of decision theory, together with suitable logical languages for expressing preferences, namely, Boutilier 5 ], Tan and Pearl 11], Dubois and Prade 7] 8]. The latter propose a qualitative utility theory based on possibility theory, where preferences and uncertainty are both qualitative. Our purpose is to extend Dubois and Prade's possibilistic framework for qualitative decision theory so as to enable multiple-stage decision making.
To the very general class of problems we consider, we give the generic name of \generalized Markov decision processes" (GMDP for short), since we always make the Markovian assumption that the past of the system cannot in uence the choice of the policy at a given time point.
Temporal structure of the decision stages: one decision stage only/ nite or discrete in nite number of decision stages. Available knowledge of the initial state. This knowledge may be precise, imprecise (described by a set of possible states), probabilistic , or possibilistic (possibility distribution on the set of possible states). At this point we recall that a possibility distribution on a set of states S is a mapping : S ! 0; 1], where (s) measures to what extent s is likely to be the actual state, ranging from 1 (completely possible) to 0 (impossible). A possibility distribution is generally assumed to be normalized (and we will make this assumption throughout the paper), i.e. 9s such that (s) = 1. When takes its value in f0; 1g, the possibility distribution is said to be crisp and is equivalent to a classical set. Thus, a description of the initial state by a crisp possibility distribution comes down to specifying a set of possible initial states. Knowledge on the e ects of actions. Actions may be deterministic, nondeterministic, stochastic or possibilistic.
Description of the goals. In the case of nitehorizon decision making, the nal state reached is often of primary importance for the global satisfaction of the agent (it may even be the only criterion). The agent may have to achieve a crisp, non-exible goal, i.e., to reach one of the goal states; the notion of goal is sometimes de ned in a more exible way, by a utility function or more generally a function on an arbitrary ordered satisfaction scale.
Role of intermediate states and actions in the global satisfaction of the agent. Intermediate states may also receive a utility degree, or more generally a satisfaction degree, which is taken into account when computing the global satisfaction attached to a path (a succession of states). The same remark applies to actions which may have a cost which also has to be taken into account. The satisfaction degrees and costs of the di erent states and actions may be aggregated additively as in classical utility theory, or qualitatively by the minimum, or by other operators. The utilities of the di erent states reached may be weighted by a discounting factor, especially in the case of innite horizon decision making 10].
Choice criterion for the policy. An optimal policy consists in attaching to each reachable state the best action, following a criterion which has to be de ned. In classical decision theory, this criterion consists in maximizing the expected utility. As to qualitative approaches, a possible criterion (which is used by Dubois and Prade 7] 8]) consists in making an assumption of commensurability between the uncertainty and the satisfaction scales and then maximizing a \pessimistic" qualitative utility (see Section 3).
Observability. A GMDP is fully observable if the state of the world is known at each step of the process, partially observable if the agent may only have an incomplete knowlegde of the state of the world. In the latter case, some tests (or knowledge-gathering actions) may be available to the agent, who uses their results to maintain his/her beliefs about the current state (represented by a set of states, or a probability distribution, or a possibility distribution...).
Dubois and Prade's possibilistic decision theory 7] 8] provides a framework for one-stage decision making with possibilistic uncertainty on the results of actions, a precise initial state s 0 , a qualitative satisfaction function on the same scale as possibility distributions. Observability considerations are not relevant since the initial state is precisely known and there is only one decision stage. Finally, the choice of the best action is based on a commensurability assumption between satisfaction and uncertainty, that we are going to describe more formally. Let S and A the set of possible states and available actions, respectively. The possible subsequent states of action a from s 0 is described by the possibility distribution (:j(s 0 ; a)). The qualitative utility is a mapping u from S to a completely ordered lattice L (typically, 0; 1]) where u(s) = 1 L and u(s) = 0 L respectively mean complete satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Then the qualitative value of a is measured by a qualitative utility function (which plays the same role as expected utility in standard decision theory), de ned by u PES (s 0 ; a) = min s2S max(n( (sj(s 0 ; a)); u(s)) where n is an order reversing function from L to L satisfying n(0) = 1 and n(1) = 0 (when L = 0; 1] the prototypical order reversing function is n(x) = 1 ? x); the best action in s 0 is then the action a maximizing u PES (s 0 ; a). The quantity u PES (s 0 ; a) is a pessimistic criterion 8]; indeed, it is the necessity of a fuzzy event, namely, it can be viewed as a degree of inclusion of the fuzzy set of more or less possible situations in the fuzzy set of preferred outcomes 8]. Note that a similar pessimistic criterion has been proposed by Whalen 12] , in terms of \disutility". Lastly, in the case where (:j(s 0 ; a)) is a crisp possibility distribution, u PES (s 0 ; a) is the utility of the worst possible outcome when performing a (this criterion is known as the Wald index).
In this paper we aim to generalize Dubois and Prade's framework to multistage decision, assuming full observability, possibilistic uncertainty and rst (Section 2) crisp goals, and then (Section 3), qualitative utility with the abovementioned commensurability assumption. We will relate our work with some other approaches to qualitative multi-stage decision making, and we will brie y give some hints on how to further generalize our framework in several ways.
POSSIBILISTIC MULTI-STAGE DECISION MAKING WITH CRISP GOALS

NOTATIONS
Following 10], let T denote the nite set of time points (or stages) at which decisions are to be made : T = f1; 2; :::; Ng. The set of possible states at stage t 2 T is denoted by S t . This is de ned for t = 1; 2; :::; N + 1 although decisions are made only at stages t = 1; 2; :::;N. At stage t, the decision maker will observe the system in state s 2 S t and choose an action a from the set of allowable actions at t in state s, denoted by A s;t . Since the e ects of the actions are ill-known, our knowledge about the subsequent state is described by a transition possibility function t :
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this rst model, we assume non-exible goals, posted only for stage N + 1. The description of the goals consists then in partitioning S N+1 into a set of goal states Goal S N+1 and a set of non-goal states (S N+1 nGoal). We are now going to de ne the optimal policies computed by a generic algorithm in the style of dynamic programming. This notion of optimal policy is based on the computation, for each t, each s 2 S t , and each a 2 A s;t , of the two quantities (Good t (s; a)) and N(Good t (s; a)) which are respectively the possibility and the necessity that performing a in state s will eventually lead to a goal state provided that the optimal strategy is followed.
Let us rst consider a state s at stage N, and let us suppose that the action a 2 A s;N is performed in s. Since the subsequent state is described by a possibilistic transition function, it is possible to compute the possibility and the necessity of the event \the subsequent state will be a goal state", An action a will then be optimal for s i for all action a 0 , a s;N a 0 . The set of optimal actions for s (at stage N) will be denoted by A s;N . Due to (1), optimal actions can be characterized more intuitively by the following property: in case there is an action a leading from s to a goal state with some certainty, i.e., N(Good N (s; a)) > 0, then A s;N is the set of actions for which N (Good N (s; a) ) is maximal; otherwise, if it is the case that N (Good N (s; a) N (s; a) ) is maximal. Now, for a given state s at stage N, an optimal policy will assign an arbitrary action in A s;N . Then, we can de ne the possibility and the necessity that a goal state can be reached from s, being the corresponding possibility and necessity degrees obtained for an optimal action for s.
De nition 3 Let a be an arbitrary action in A s;N (Good N (s)) = (Good N (s; a ) ) N(Good N (s)) = N (Good N (s; a ) ) This de nition is well-formulated since (Good N (s; a ) ) and N (Good N (s; a ) ) are constant for all actions a in A s;N . Due to (1), it can be checked easily that the de nition is equivalent to (Good N (s)) = max a2As;N (Good N (s; a) ) and N(Good N (s)) = max a2As;N N (Good N (s; a) ). In other terms, (Good N (s)) (resp. N(Good N (s))) is the possibility (resp. the necessity) of the event \there is a policy which leads from s to a goal state", or equivalently, \performing an optimal action in s leads to a goal state". It follows that Proposition 2 (Good N (s)) and N(Good N (s)) are standard possibility and necessity degrees By backwards induction, we are now going to dene, for every stage t, for every s 2 S t and every a 2 A s;t : (i) the possibility and the necessity degrees that performing a in s, followed by an optimal policy for stages t + 1 to N, will eventually lead to a goal state; this event will be denoted by Good t (s; a); and (ii) the possibility and necessity degrees that a goal state can be reached from s following an optimal policy for stages t to N. This event will be denoted Good t (s). More formally: An action a is optimal for s at stage t i for all a 0 , a s;t a 0 . The set of optimal actions for s (at stage t) will be denoted by A s;t . An optimal policy assigns to each stage s an optimal action .
De nition 6 Let a be an arbitrary action in A s;t (Good t (s)) = (Good t (s; a )) N(Good t (s)) = N(Good t (s; a )) (Good t (s)) and N(Good t (s)), are respectively measuring to what extent applying an optimal policy from s will lead possibly (resp. certainly) to a goal state at stage N + 1. They are actually the possibility and necessity measures of the event \there is a policy which leads from s to a goal state".
COMPUTING AN OPTIMAL POLICY
An optimal policy can be computed by a possibilistic variant of dynamic programming 2]; it computes the policy backwards (from later stages to earlier ones). The correctness of the algorithm comes straightforwardly from the recursive de nition of an optimal policy. Interestingly, the use of qualitative operators (min and max) { instead of + and product for classical MDP { gives us more opportunities to avoid unnecessary computations; thus, a given action may be detected to be sub-optimal w.r.t. a given state before the whole computation of (Good t (s; a)) and N(Good t (s; a)) is completed (*). (1 ? t (s 0 j(s; a) ); N(Good t+1 (s 0 )))); if n < n opt then EXIT loop4 (*) endif ; fin this case a is sub-optimal, since n can only decreaseg end loop4; if n > n opt then n opt = n; a opt = a; 
PROBLEM FORMULATION
A possibilistic exible Markov decision process is dened as in Section 2.1, plus a utility function u over the nal states. This utility on nal states will be used to allow to compare decisions. This comparison is based on two di erent indices, depending on whether we take an optimistic or a pessimistic point of view.
PESSIMISTIC UTILITY
Each state s 0 2 S N+1 has a utility u(s 0 ). According to a pessimistic point of view, we can say that action a in state s is all the better as the worst possible outcome s 0 has a high utility. This leads us to an assumption of commensurability : we assume that 1 ? N (s 0 j(s; a)), and u(s 0 ) are expressed on the same scale. As in 8] we de ne then the pessimistic utility index by:
De It can be shown by induction that u PES t (s) is the necessity of the fuzzy event :\there is a policy which leads from s to a goal state". If u only uses 0 or 1 possibility levels (crisp goal set), u PES t (s; a) is nothing but N (Good t (s; a) ) and u PES t (s) is N (Good t (s) ).
OPTIMISTIC UTILITY
According to an optimistic point of view, we could say that action a in state s is all the better as the best possible outcome s 0 has a high utility. This point of view leads us to the assumption that utilities on nal states and transition possibilities are commensurable : we assume that t (s 0 j(s; a)), and u(s 0 ) are expressed on the same scale.
De nition 8 u OPT N+1 (s) = u(s), 8s u OPT t (s; a) = Sup s 0 2St+1 min( t (s 0 j(s; a)); u OPT t+1 (s 0 )) 8(a; a 0 ) 2 A s;t a OPT s;t a' i u OPT t (s; a) u OPT t (s; a 0 ) u OPT t (s) = u OPT t (s; a ) for a a 2 A OPT s;t where A OPT s;t is the set of optimal actions according to OPT s;t .
The criterion is a generalisation to multi-stage decision of the index E( ) = max x2X min( (x); u(x)) rst proposed by Yager 13] and later used by Kacprzyk 9 ] (see also Conclusion). u OPT N (s; a) is the degree of intersection of the fuzzy set of possible successors of s when a is applied with the fuzzy set of goal states : it is the possibility degree of the fuzzy event \a in state s will lead to a goal state". The measures generalize (Good t (s; a)) and (Good t (s)).
REFINING THE DECISION ORDERING
The pessimistic criterion allowed us to de ne sets of pessimistic optimal policies (i.e cautious). Unfortunately, in many real problems, such a criterion may prove to be insu ciently discriminating : there may be too many optimal policies. As in section 2, the idea is to discriminate among actions which have the same pessimistic utility using the optimistic one. An important fact to notice is that the optimal actions with respect to u PES are not necessarily optimal with respect to u OPT . If the set A s;t of possible actions in state s in stage t is nite we can always nd an action a OPT such that u OPT (s) = u OPT (s; a OPT ), and an action a PES such that u PES (s) = u PES (s; a PES ). Still in the general case, a OPT and a PES will be di erent. Since our option of ordering actions is cautious, we will use the optimistic utility to re ne the pessimistic utility ordering. Hence the possibilistic utility of an action at stage t given that an optimal policy is chosen for stages t + 1 to N will be denoted u OPT Bellman and Zadeh's fuzzy set-based approaches to multistage decision making 3] assume a qualitative utility function (where intermediate utilities of di erent states are aggregated by min) and transition functions which are either deterministic, or stochastic. This last approach can be seen as a semi-qualitative, semi-quantitative approach to decision making. The selection criterion for the optimal policy consists in maximizing the expected qualitative utility. On the contrary, our framework is fully qualitative (both on the uncertainty and the utility side). Other signi cant work about using possibility theory for multi-stage decision making has been done by Kacprzyk 9] and also Baldwin and Pilsworth 1]. Kacprzyk 9] de nes an optimal policy by maximising the aforementioned optimistic criterion u OPT at each stage. He computes it with a branch and bound algorithm; however, as noticed by Dubois and Prade 8] , maximizing u OPT is practically not reasonable; to make the argument simpler, suppose that all transition possibilities are binary (8s; s; s 0 ; (s 0 j(s; a)) 2 f0; 1g), then maximizing u OPT comes down to assume at each stage that the best possible outcome occurs (in other words, the agent takes its desires for reality). The author also proposes extensions of his approach to the cases where termination time is fuzzy, or in nite. The alternative approach of Baldwin and Pilsworth 1], similar to dynamic programming, also consists in maximising an optimistic criterion, but the search is performed over a set of fuzzy states and the maximisation over a set of fuzzy decisions, which, as noticed by Kacprzyk 9] , makes the approach practically unreasonable due to its computational complexity.
Further work would consist rst in implementing the proposed algorithms, taking account of the suggested techniques (and possibly others) for avoiding unnecessary computations. Next, we think of generalising our framework in several directions. Considering the contribution of intermediate states and actions performed to the global utility function: the most natural way to do it in a purely qualitative way consists in combining these qualitative utilities by the minimum, for instance for u PES we get u and u PES t (s) = max a2As;t u PES t (s; a). Integrating these intermediate utilities in the framework described in Section 3 does not present any particular di culty. We could also retract the assumption of full observability. To this purpose we may adapt some methodologies and results from partially observable Markov decision processes. In this case we would have to consider the presence of information-gathering actions in policies. Lastly, we think that developing qualitative approaches to multiple-stage decision making would provide alternative frameworks for decision-theoretic planning. Namely, some work is currently being done in the direction of applying possibilistic GMDP to an agricultural planning problem 6].
